

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/10/29 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000400030016-3

NSC BRIEFING

8 November 1954

SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

I. Reactions to General Collins' mission vary.

A. Paris officials welcome it; hope US support for Diem waning.

25X1

C. General Ely feared mission would appear as US intent "takeover"

D. But later his deputy described it as logical move.

E. Added, French position is: Diem must make peace with army, get capable interior minister (no doubt Tam)

II. Bao Dai still very much in the act.

A. Saw Collins mission useful to demand Diem be more co-operative

State Department review completed

Approved For Release 2003/10/29 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000400030016-3

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/10/29 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000400030016-3

B. Says he is father of "naughty children" who must be brought into line.

25X1

D. Diem admits Bao Dai's "support" has large price tag.

III. Meanwhile Buu Hoi build-up getting bigger.

A. French press giving him big play.

B. Has backing of some of Mendes' principal advisers.

25X1

IV. Several possible French motives for backing Buu Hoi.

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/10/29 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000400030016-3

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/10/29 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000400030016-3

- A. One may keep pot boiling,
leave room for maneuver.
- B. More important, Buu Hoi's
background jibes with French
desires get along with Viet Minh.
- C. Buu Hoi "incredibly naive,"
according Heath, thus probably
easily manipulated.
- D. Diem describes him as not immoral,
but amoral, a "seive for money,"
with two French and other
mistresses.
- E. Told Diem year ago he for Viet
Minh because it efficient.

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/10/29 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000400030016-3